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BOOK REVIEW
THE GOLDMARK CASE. By William L. Dwyer.
Seattle and London, University of Washington
Press, 1984. 291 pages. Price about $16.00.
Reviewed by John N. Rupp*
This is a good book, one that you should buy. If you think
the price is high, buy it anyway. And what, after all, is a "high
price"? Does not the answer lie in the observation of the perspi-
cacious fellow who remarked, "If they keep raising the price of
whiskey, pretty soon they'll get it up to about what whiskey's
worth."
The book is about a libel case tried to a jury in the Superior
Court for Okanogan County, Washington. You will not find it in
the law reports, for it was not appealed. It ended twenty-one
years ago, so it is an old case. Yet in the author's mind it is as
fresh as the dawn breeze; and, as the wine people say, it has
cellared well.
The author is a good man and good lawyer who was lead
counsel for the plaintiff. He takes us through the background
facts and through the fascinating detail of the many tough deci-
sions that daily went into the preparation and the trial. He tells
us of the jury verdict for the plaintiff and of the elation that
accompanied it; and then he relates the strange irony that
resulted in the verdict's having to be set aside.
All this you will learn when you read the book. If you read
what others have written about the book, you will encounter
some conclusions about it that may divert your attention. Be
warned. I illustrate the point by anecdote.
Some schools for actors stress not only the importance of
understanding the play and the various parts in it, but also an
assumed necessity for the actor to delve into the deeper psycho-
logical motivations which, those schools assume, underlie the
nature and the development of every main character in any play.
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In a 1977 newspaper interview Jimmy Stewart told of an inci-
dent that stemmed from that sort of teaching. The picture was
"Vertigo," directed by Alfred Hitchcock. One day on the set the
leading lady, Kim Novak, piped up, "Mr. Hitchcock, what is my
character feeling in relation to her surroundings?" Hitchcock
stared at her incredulously, and there was dead silence. Then he
said, "It's only a movie, for God's sake!"
That attitude-the approach of the hardheaded profes-
sional-is also exemplified in the colloquy between George Ber-
nard Shaw and a young author who sought Shaw's advice on a
literary career. "Write plays," said Shaw. Seeking elucidation,
and perhaps expecting Shaw to rhapsodize about the great value
of the drama form in delineating and developing characters, the
young man asked him why. Shaw replied, "They will keep you in
your old age."
I thought of those anecdotes when reading the comments on
Bill Dwyer's book made by reviews and the writers of the dust-
jacket blurbs and the foreword. All these good people purport to
find great social significance in Goldmark v. Canwell. They call
it a "morality play," they speak of "fear and prejudice born of
ignorance" and of "the clashing values of our complicated soci-
ety," they tell us of evil "McCarthyism," and of the great wis-
dom of the "jury of rural westerners," and so on. And yet all the
time I kept thinking, "It's only a lawsuit, for God's sake."
Lest you yield to that which is likely your first thought on
reading that paragraph and say to yourself, "That guy John
Rupp is getting remarkably crusty in his old age" (or perchance,
"just as crusty as he always was"), ask yourself two questions:
(1) Where would all the social significance be if the jury, as
juries have been known to do, had voted the other way? (2)
Aren't all these commentators missing the point when they say
hardly a word about the remarkable performance of Goldmark's
lawyers, Bill Dwyer and R.E. Mansfield-where might that fine
"jury of rural westerners" who "renewed our faith in the jury
system" have gone without Dwyer and Mansfield to show them
the way?
To my mind the significance of the book is that it is an
exemplar of the good that comes from wise and careful prepara-
tion of a lawsuit and from patient, courteous, and skillful pres-
entation in the long days in the courtroom.
In short, ladies and gentlemen, read this book. You will
enjoy it and you will learn from it. But read it as an account of a
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lawsuit because that's what it is. And that's enough, is it not? A
well crafted lawsuit, like a fine production of a good play, is a
noble thing in itself. It is a soundly built tub which stands on its
own bottom. It need not be wrapped in blankets of oleaginous
praise and saluted with French horns and oboes as a great
landmark, or a morality play, or as the inevitable triumph of
good over evil. The realistic Mr. Hitchcock meant no denigration
when he remarked, "It's only a movie, for God's sake".
It is not a book reviewer's function to tell all about the
book. One who does so is like the clumsy master of ceremonies
who introduces a speaker by telling the audience what the
speaker is going to say. Still, I must tell you enough of the sali-
ent facts to introduce you to the drama of the lawsuit and to its
difficulties.
The protagonist was John Goldmark, an Okanogan County
rancher. His main antagonists were Al Canwell, Ashley Holden,
Loris Gillespie and Don Caron, all members of what the book
calls "the radical right." They, however, viewed themselves sim-
ply as fighters against Communism. The libels were published
during Goldmark's campaign for a fourth term in the State
House of Representatives in which Goldmark was soundly
defeated for the Democratic nomination. None of the publica-
tions said that Goldmark was actually a Communist, but the
implications and the innuendoes were to that effect. For exam-
ple, he was called "a Communist tool," and the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU), of which he was said to be a prominent
member, was flatly called "a Communist front." If false, the
statements were quite clearly libelous. The defense would have
to be that they were true or, at least, that they were "fair
comment."
Now, why would even the most "wild-eyed Communist
fighter" suppose that an Okanogan rancher was a Communist or
a Communist tool or a "fellow traveller"? Well, to begin with, he
was a New Yorker, he was part Jewish, he was a graduate of
Harvard Law School, he was a member of the ACLU, he was a
"liberal Democrat," and his son went to Reed College. Wow!
And not only that; he had never practiced law, but had come
way out to the Okanogan country and, of all things, bought a
ranch. Why did he do that? Who put up the money? Then
pretty soon he got into the Legislature and became a leader of
his party there. Before he came West after World War II he had
served in the Navy in the Pacific as a bomb-disposal officer. (I,
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at least, always admired those bomb-disposal folks. The thing
that set them apart from the rest of us was that, if we made a
mistake, it might have serious consequences, but a bomb fellow's
mistake was sure to have an immediate and personal bad
result-one might have trouble finding even his dog tags.). And
in what does a bomb-disposal man become expert? Why, bombs,
of course, all kinds of bombs. Then, too, he had learned to fly
and he had an airplane and an air strip on his ranch. He could
come and go swiftly and surreptitiously. It all fit together in
their minds: obviously this mysterious Mr. Goldmark was a
secret Communist plant acting under the carefully chosen cover
of a rancher.
Then there was a real "clincher." Mrs. Goldmark had been
an actual Communist, the real dues-paying article! And not only
that-she was a Communist when they were married in 1942,
and the "experts" on Communism said that the party would
never have let her marry Goldmark unless they approved of him.
Moreover, she didn't use her real given name, Irma. She said she
didn't like it so she renamed herself "Sally." She had joined the
party in 1935 while working in a government job in Washington,
D.C., and she stayed on for eight years, until 1943. She said she
had dropped out then, but the "experts" said you couldn't just
"drop out" of the party. The Goldmarks had not told any of this
to the general public of Okanogan County.
Right in the middle of the trial President Kennedy was
assassinated by Lee Harvey Oswald. Who was Oswald? Why, he
was a Marxist who had been to Russia and was an admirer of
Castro in Cuba. He was a member of the ACLU and said he
wanted an ACLU lawyer to defend him. See? "They" are every-
where and will stop at nothing.
I tell you all this not "for the truth of the matters asserted
therein" but to show you that this was a tough case. It was hard
to prepare and hard to try.
The Goldmarks' Complaint alleged a conspiracy by the
defendants, so there had to be considerable pre-trial discovery.
The defendants were represented by able counsel: Glenn Har-
mon of Spokane, Ned Kimball of Waterville, and retired Judge
Joseph Wicks of Okanogan. The judge was the highly respected
Theodore S. Turner, visiting from Seattle. The trial itself took
two months. Witnesses for both sides came from all over the
United States. Many reputations were at stake-not only those
of the parties, but those of the ACLU and of several witnesses.
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The case received considerable attention from the news
media-local, state, and national. Dwyer's book takes us through
the trial, step-by-step and in detail. He is as good a book-writer
as he is a lawyer.
Finally the verdict came in, ten-to-two for the plaintiffs and
a total award of $40,000, which was a large amount in 1964. The
Goldmarks' good name was restored, and the ACLU was vindi-
cated. There was relief and joy in the hearts of the Goldmarks
and their lawyers. To be sure, the defendants would probably
appeal, but it seemed fairly certain that the verdict would stand
up on appeal. Anyway, the verdict certainly restored the
Goldmarks' good name.
But now nine new and unexpected actors stalked onto the
stage. Before Judge Turner could hear the usual post-trial
motions and enter judgment on the verdict, the Supreme Court
of the United States handed down its opinion in New York
Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Suddenly, we learned a
new doctrine of the law of libel and we learned, too, that it was
not only a new rule-it was a principle of constitutional law.
Thus, it was both prospective and retroactive in its application.
Ironically, this new rule had been strongly urged on the Court
by the ACLU.
Under the new rule, if you are a "public figure," a person
can say or write even the most outrageous lies about you so long
as he does not do so with malice or with a reckless disregard of
whether the statements are true or false. Since you must now
prove not only the falsity of the statements but also the subjec-
tive element of the presence of malice or "reckless disregard" in
the mind of your defamer, you have a heavy burden indeed. As a
member of, and a candidate for, the legislature, Goldmark was
obviously a "public figure."
Had he borne this burden, newly thrust upon him? The
matter was briefed and argued at length before Judge Turner.
Finally he concluded, as the jury had concluded, that Goldmark
was not a Communist nor a pro-Communist, that the ACLU was
not a Communist front, and that the charges against Goldmark
were false. Then, however, he went on to conclude, with some
reluctance I bet, that the rule of the New York Times case
required him to set aside the verdict and enter judgment for the
defendants.
So he did that, and there the case ended.
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